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CHANGES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

SUGGESTED CHANGES IN OUR CRIMINAL PROCEDURE*
Charles S. Pottst

T

I. As TO THE LAw OF ARRESTS

HE Anglo-American law of arrest took shape in England some

three hundred years ago, and has been only slightly changed
since that time. It badly needs overhauling. A few obvious changes
are here suggested for consideration.
1. All misdemeanors in officer's presence. Peace officers should
be allowed to arrest without warrant for all misdemeanors committed in their presence or within their view, whether or not a
breach of the peace is involved.' It seems quite absurd to require
a peace officer to stand idly by while a misdemeanor that happens
not to involve a breach of peace is committed in his presence.
2. Summons in lieu of arrest. In case of an arrest for a misdemeanor the officer should be allowed to give the defendant, if a
resident of the county, an appearance ticket or summons, as is now
done in cases of traffic violations, rather than to haul him off to
police headquarters to make bond.2 An adequate penalty should
be provided for his failure to appear at the time and place named.
3. Resisting a known officer unlawful. It should be unlawful
for a citizen to resist a known officer, whether the arrest be wrongful or not. This is the rule in cases of wrongful seizure of property
under a writ of attachment or of sequestration.' The respective
* The writer has been assisted in the preparation of this article by a grant from the
Carnegie Fund for the Advancement of Teaching.
t Dean Emeritus, School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
IORFiELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST To APPEAL (1947) 18-21; AM. L.
INST. CODE CRIM. PeOC. § 21; Uniform Arrest Act, § 6 [the entire Act is set out in Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 316, 343, 345 (1942) ]; Waite, The Law of
Arrest, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 279, 305 (1946); Potts, The Law of Arrest, 1 Baylor L Rev.
397, 400-402 (1949).
2 O FIvLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL (1947) 31-33, 131; FED.
RULES CraM. Paoc. Rule 4(a); AM. L. INST. CODE Cam. lNoc. §§ 12-16; Potts, The
Law of Arrest, 1 Baylor L. Rev. 406408 (1949).
8 State v. Downer, 8 Vt. 424, 30 Am. Dec. 482 (1836) ; Witherspoon v. State, 42 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 532, 61 S. W. 396 (1901) ; State v. Selengut, 38 R. I. 302, 95 At. 503 (1915) ;
Waite, The Law of Arrest, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 279, 306 (1946) ; Potts, The Law of Arrest,
1 Baylor L. Rev. 397, 405 (1949).
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rights involved in an arrest cannot be adjudicated instantly at the
point of a pistol in the hands of the arrestee.
4. Officer need not have warrant. The arresting officer should
not be required to have the warrant of arrest in his possession as
the law now requires. It should be sufficient for him to state to the
defendant that a warrant has been issued and will be shown to him
at a convenient time and place.' A very large number of arrests in
cities are now made by officers in police cars, alerted by radio, who
must act speedily and without the possibility of securing warrants.
5. Abuse of prisonersby officer. Some means should be devised
for securing the proper enforcement of our statutes enacted to
protect prisoners from abuse at the hands of peace officers and

jailors.

TEXAS PENAL CODE

(Vernon, 1948), art. 1176, which has

been on the statute books many decades, provides for a heavy fine
and jail sentence for any officer who shall wilfully prevent any
prisoner from consulting or communicating with his attorney. In
1923 the legislature went further and provided for a fine not to
exceed $1000, and imprisonment not to exceed one year in jail,
and, within the discretion of the jury, permanent disqualification
from holding public office, for any officer who should thereafter
"torture, torment, or punish" any prisoner in his custody "for the
purpose of making him confess to any knowledge of the commission of any offense against the laws of this state."'
It is common knowledge that these statutes are frequently violated, but apparently only one criminal case against a public officer has reached the Court of Criminal Appeals. That case, against
a captain of detectives in Houston, was reversed because it was
brought in the county court when it should have been brought in
the district court, as involving "official misconduct." 6
Nearly a score of Texas cases, where confessions were secured
by "third degree" methods and were wrongfully admitted in evi4 See FED. RULES OF CalM. Paoc. Rule 4(e) ; Am. L. Inst. Code Crim. Proc. § 24;
Uniform Arrest Act, § 8; Potts, The Law of Arrest, 1 Baylor L Rev. 397, 402 (1949).
5 TEX. PEN. CODE (Vernon, 1948) art. 1157.
6 Simpson v. State, 138 Tex. Crim. Rep. 622, 137 S. W. 2d 1035 (1940).
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dence, are summarized in an article recently published by the
present writer.7
II.

SUGGESTED CHANGES AS TO BAIL

1. Money bail. A deposit of money or of United States bonds,
or of state or municipal bonds of equal value, should be accepted
in lieu of a bail bond.'
2. "Jumping bail" should be made a penal offense. In Texas
and many other states bail is a constitutional right in all cases
except where "the offense is capital and the proof is evident." 9
Under this constitutional provision a person charged with a noncapital felony, where the proof is not evident is entitled to be released on bail, regardless of the number and gravity of the crimes
of which he previously may have been convicted, and also regardless of the number of times he has forfeited bail in this or other
states. Two possible remedies for this situation suggest themselves: (a) to amend the constitution so as to authorize judges and
justices of the peace, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, to deny bail to persons who have in the past wilfully forfeited bail; or (b) to make wilfully forfeiting bail a grave penal
offense.
3. Crimes committed by persons on bail. The penalty to be
assessed for any crime committed while the defendant is out on
bail might very properly be increased, possibly even doubled. This
would tend to put a check on professional criminals who have their
bondsmen get them out of jail speedily and go right on with their
malefactions.
4. More speedy systems of forfeiting bail. The present system
T Potts, The PreliminaryExamination and the Third Degree, 2 Baylor Law Rev. 131,
150(1950). For illustrations of the sort of third degree abuses here referred to see
the following federal and Texas cases: Wan v. United States, 266 U. S. 1 (1924);

Williams v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. Rep. 87, 225 S. W. 177 (1920) ; Sigler v. State, 139
Tex. Crim. Rep. 167, 139 S.W. 2d 277 (1940) ; White v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. Rep. 660,
128 S.W. 2d 51 (1939), rev'd, 310 U. S. 530 (1940) ; Ward v.State, 144 Tex. Crim. Rep.
444, 158 S.W. 2d 516 (1941), rev'd, 316 U. S. 547 (1942) ; Cavazos v. State, 143 Tex.
Crim. Rep. 564,.160 S. W. 2d 260 (1942).
8 AM. L. INST. CODE CRIM. PaOC. § 87.
9 Tax. CONST. Art I, § 11.
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of forfeiting bail should be abolished and a more expeditious and
effective one put in use. In the federal courts, if the defendant fails
to appear when his case is called for trial, judgment forfeiting
bail is immediately entered. A "show-cause" order is then issued
to defendant and his sureties, commanding defendant and his
sureties to come in within ten days or two weeks, and show cause,
if any they have, why the forfeiture should be set aside. At the
expiration of the period fixed in the order, if the defendant and
his sureties do not come in and show good cause for his failure to
appear for his trial, the forfeiture becomes final and execution is
promptly issued to collect the bond.' 0 In our state courts the hearing on the forfeiture is, by statute, put off to the next term of court,
three months or six months later, and the judgment of forfeiture
is rarely made permanent, and more rarely still is the judgment
finally collected.
5. Professionalbondsmen. Persons desiring to write bail bonds
as a business should first be required to secure a permit to do so
from the State Department of Insurance, after a showing of good
character and of financial responsibility, as is now required of
persons and corporations wishing to write fidelity bonds.
III.

WAIVING INDICTMENT AND TRIAL BY JURY

1. Waiving indictment in felony cases. Many persons arrested
for serious crimes are unable to make bond. Even if they are innocent, they must, under existing statutes, remain in jail until the
impaneling of the next grand jury, which may be as far off as
three months in the populous counties, or as much as six months in
the smaller counties. It would, therefore, be a great boon to such
persons to permit them to waive indictment by the grand jury and
stand trial at once on information filed by the district attorney.
About three-fourths of the states now permit all persons to waive
the formality of indictment and secure a trial as soon as possible
on information filed by the district attorney."
10

FED. RULES CRIM.

11 AM. L. INST.

PRoc. Rule 46(f).

CODE OF CRIM. PROC. §

113.

19501

CHANGES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

The American Law Institute's rule on waiving indictment reads
as follows:
"Section 113. Prosecutionby information or indictment. All offenses
heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment may be prosecuted
either by indictment or by information."
The federal rule on waiving indictment is very similar. It follows:
"Rule 7(b). Waiver of Indictment. An offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor
may be prosecuted by information if the defendant, after he has been
advised as to the nature of the charge
and of his rights, waives in open
12
court prosecution by indictment."'

2. Waiving trial by jury. There seems to be no reason why the
defendant in felony cases as well as misdemeanor cases should not
be permitted to waive trial by jury, under proper safeguards.
Waiving trial by jury is permitted in a large part of the AngloAmerican world-in England, in Canada, in our federal courts,
and in twenty of our states." Wherever tried for any length of
time, trial by judges without juries has proven to be popular with
defendants, as well as a great saver of time and money. In England about 85 percent of indictable offenses are tried without
jury. In Maryland and Connecticut the percentages of waivers are
nearly as high.
In Maryland, former Supreme Court Justice Carroll T. Bond
some years ago declared that two crminal courts were able to keep
completely abreast of their dockets in Baltimore, then a city of
800,000. Continuing he said:
.
12The drafting commission offered the following comment on Rule 7b: "Opportunity to waive indictment and to consent to prosecution by information will be a substantial aid to defendants, especially those who, because of inability to give bail, are
incarcerated pending action of the grand jury, but desire to plead guilty ....
In many
districts where the grand jury meets infrequently a defendant unable to give bail and
desiring to plead guilty is compelled to spend many days, and sometimes many weeks,
and even months, in jail before he can begin the service of his sentence, whatever it
may be, awaiting the action of a grand jury."
13 Handley, Some Observations on Waiver of Jury Trial in Felony Cases, 1 Tex. L.
& Leg. 45-54 (1947) ; see also Johnson, Waiver of Indictment in Texas, 1 Tex. L. & Leg.
22 (1947); Potts, Waiver of ln;2ictment in Felony Cases, 3 Southwestern L. J. 437
(1949).
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"At times there is not enough unfinished business for two courts,
and one is able to keep up with the work. It is ordinarily possible to
give trials without any delay beyond such time as may be needed for
preparation, and there are times when the court seems too close on the
heels of the grand jury, when the court is prepared to give trial on the
day after indictment.
"For some years now, only one jury panel has been kept in attendance upon two criminal courts, and, even so, the jurymen spend much
of their time sitting aside as spectators.
"Of the 1500 criminal cases docketed during the four months of the
January (1925) term of the Criminal Court of Baltimore city, all
except 177, mostly those last docketed, were disposed of before the
final day of the term. Unquestionably this comparatively rapid
dis1x
posal of business is due to the prevalence of trials without jury. '

In Texas we have long had a statute permitting the waiver of
trial by jury in misdemeanor cases."5 Also, in non-capital cases
where the defendant pleads guilty, he may waive a jury and be
tried by the judge.16 These statutes have been upheld by our Court
of Criminal Appeals." In view of these holdings it seems clear
that there is no constitutional barrier in the way of repealing
Article 11 of the Code. of Criminal Procedure, first enacted in 1856,
which declares that the defendant "may waive any right secured to
him by law, except the right of trial by jury in a felony case."
That statute was passed as a concession to the conservatives of
that day, but the experience of a hundred years has demonstrated
in this state and elsewhere that there is much to be gained by
allowing defendants to waive their right to trial by jury under
proper safeguards. It is believed that such a change in our law
would aid us greatly in keeping up with our over-crowded dockets
14

Bond, The Maryland Practice of Trying Criminal Cases by Judges alone, without

Juries, 11 A.B.A.J. 699.703 (1925).
In a letter to the present writer, dated Sept. 28, 1950, Chief Justice Allyn L. Brown,
of the Supreme Court of Connecticut, gives figures showing that the situation in that
state in regard to waiving trial by jury is approximately the same as in Maryland, as
shown in Judge Bond's article.
15 TEx. CoDE CRaN. PROC. (Vernon, 1948) art. 518; Moore v. State, 22 Tex. Ct. App.
117, 2 S. W. 634 (1886).
15 TEx. CODE CaRM.PROC. (Vernon, 1948) arts. 10a and 12.
17 McMillan v. State, 122 Tex. Crim. Rep. 583, 57 S.W. 2d 125 (1933) ; Bolton v.
State, 123 Tex. Crim. Rep. 543, 59 S.W. 2d 833 (1933).
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in our large cities, especially if we can improve the quality of our
judges by removing them from the political mire in which they
now flounder.
3. Repeal of Article 687 of our Code of Criminal Procedure.
A slight statutory change might be made that would prevent a
goodly number of mistrials in felony cases every year. Reference
is here made to the situation when one or more jurors die during
the course of the trial, or are otherwise unable to continue to
serve. Under our existing law, the discharge of a juror abruptly
ends the trial, and the case must be reset and retried.
Now, the constitution-makers of 1875 foresaw this contingency and in their wisdom provided that when such a situation
should arise, the trial should continue without interruption and
the remaining jurors, if not fewer than nine in number, should
have authority to render the verdict." The leaders in the Convention felt so strongly on the subject that they provided in the
constitution that the new procedure should go into effect at once
upon the ratification of the constitution. However, they further
provided that "the Legislature may change or modify the rule
authorizing less than the whole number of the jury to render a
verdict." At the next session of the legislature, that body abolished
the Constitutional Convention's plan by passing a law that reappears as Article 687 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure.
This article declares that "not less than twelve jurors can render
and return a verdict in a felony case."' 9
This article forces the defendant to submit to trial by a jury of
twelve, even though he might prefer to be tried by the judge, and,
as pointed out above, it forces the judge to declare a mistrial
even though both the state and the defendant may be willing, or
even eager, to finish the trial with the remaining jurors.
18 Trx.CONST.

Art. 5, 1 13.
1s Before this act became effective one murder case had been decided by an elevenman jury, and their verdict was upheld by the Court of Appeals. Ray v. State, 4 Tex.
Ct. App. 450 (1878). Another case, involving a verdict in a civil case returned by a vote
of ten jurors to two, was upheld by the Supreme Court of Texas. Bowen v. Davis, 48
Tex. 101 (1877).
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This unfortunate situation can be met in one of three ways:
(1) by outright repeal of Article 687, which would automatically
restore the Constitutional Convention's plan; or (2) by providing
for the impaneling, at the beginning of the trial of one or two
alternate jurors who should sit and hear the evidence but would
not participate in reaching the verdict, unless a regular juror or
two should have to be discharged; 20 and (3) by providing by
statute that if a juror should be discharged, the attorneys for the
an agreeState and the defendant might, in open court, enter into
21
jurors.
remaining
the
by
verdict
a
to
proceed
to
ment
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that waiving
trial by jury does not deny due process or equal protection.22
IV.

SELECTING THE GRAND JURY

1. Avoiding race-discrimination. The jury commissioners in
the counties should be required to see that different racial groups
are represented on the panel from which the grand jurors are to
be selected. This representation should be approximately in proportion to their numbers in the county. Racial groups too small
to have a member selected each year, might have a grand juror
on alternate years or even less often.
2. Challenging grand jurors after impanelment. It might also
be desirable to permit a person, whose alleged crime is committed
after the grand jury has been impaneled, to challenge for good
cause shown not to exceed three grand jurors, if he wishes to do
so, and to have the remaining members pass on his case, the
challenged grand jurors to absent themselves only during the
consideration of the challenger's case. It is believed that the foregoing changes would obviate such racial appeals to the United
States Supreme Court as are referred to in the note. 8
20 See Churchill, Alternate Jurors-A Remedy for Felony Mistrials? 1 Tex. L. & Leg.
80 (1947).

21 For recent data on states that waive trial by jury, see Handley, Some Observations

on Waiver of Jury Trial in Criminal Cases, 1 Tex. L. & Leg. 45 (1947).
22

Patton v. U. S., 281 U. S. 276 (1930); see also FFD. RuLEs

CRIM.

PRoc. Rule 23.

28 Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900); Akin v. Texas, 325 U. S. 9 (1944) ; Pierre
v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354 (1939).
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V.

SELECTING THE TRIAL JURY

1. The special venire in capital cases. This institution seems
to serve no useful purpose, but raises a great many vexatious
problems, and results in more delay than any other single cause.
In our larger counties the number of men summoned on special
venire has grown larger and larger until now three hundred to
five hundred are frequently called.
On a few occasions in recent years a capital case has been
set to begin on the same Monday morning in each of the two
criminal district courts of Dallas County. On such occasions as
many as seven hundred to a thousand men-farmers, businessmen,
laborers-may be summoned to appear as jurors, an army of
men larger than that commanded by General Sam Houston when
he won our independence at the battle of San Jacinto. But the
large numbers summoned is not the worst of it. Before the
process of questioning the prospective jurors can begin, the court
may have to sit for hours listening to arguments by the attorneys
on motions for continuance, motions to change the venue, and
motions to quash the indictment.
Finally, the slow process of testing the qualifications of the
prospective jurors begins, each man being brought in, sworn,
and examined separately for half an hour to an hour and a half.
During all this time the remaining scores of jurors fill the vacant
rooms and corridors in the court house, or, in decent weather,
loiter on the lawn, growing more and more restive and disgusted
as the weary process grinds to a close toward the end of the
week. For most of them, several days, or even a whole week has
gone, and they have nothing to show for it. Tired and disgusted
they furnish fertile soil for the seeds of Communism.
Now, most of this loss of time and tempers could be avoided
by the adoption of a few non-radical changes:
1. All preliminary motions should be heard by the judge and disposed of before the day set for the trial on the merits. This would enable
the court to begin the process of impaneling the jury as soon as the
court opens for business on Monday morning.
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2. The jurors should be examined as to their qualifications in a
group, as is now done in this state in non-capital cases, and as is done
23
in all cases in the federal courts. 1

3. The trial judge should be given the authority either to question
prospective jurors himself, affording counsel an opportunity to suggest
additional questions, or to permit counsel to do the questioning if done
fairly and with reasonable dispatch. The former is the better method,
for it is always difficult to choke off zealous counsel and to confine questioning to essential matters.

The adoption of these simple measures would, it is believed,
not only greatly reduce the time required for qualifying the
jurors, but would also largely reduce the number of prospective

jurors that would be needed. This writer is firmly convinced that
in capital cases the number of prospective jurors that would need
to be summoned could be reduced to one-third of the number now
summoned, and that the time for impaneling the jury could be
reduced to one-fifth that now consumed.
These estimates are based on the answers to a questionnaire

that the writer sent to judges and district attorneys in a number
of our larger counties, and to the federal judges in Texas. Their
answers show that the process of selecting the jury in capital cases
in the state courts averages about 3 days and sometimes requires
a week or longer, while the required time for selecting the jury
in non-capital cases averages about 2 hours. In the federal
courts, where there are no special venires, it rarely, if ever, requires longer than two hours to select a jury, and sometimes requires not more than ten to fifteen minutes.
2. Present machinery wholly inadequate. Our present criminal
machinery is wholly inadequate in our larger counties. Four years
ago in Dallas County two or three thousand felony indictments
and misdemeanor cases were dismissed at one time; and now, in
spite of the very earnest efforts of our two criminal district courts,
and of a number of out-of-county district judges who have been
sent in to assist the local courts, there is, according to press re28' This practice is permitted but not favored by our Court of Criminal Appeals. See
Stout, The Examination o1 Prospective Jurors in Capital Cases, 29 Tex. L. Rev. 34,
35 (1950).
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ports, a back-log of some 1,500 felony cases waiting to be tried.
Our two criminal district courts are able to try felony cases at
the rate of only three or four per week, but felonies are being
committed in this county of 600,000 people at the rate of five or
six per day. So we are falling further behind every day.
It is believed that conditions in Dallas County are not materially different from those in the other populous counties of the
state. And the evil is cumulative. The longer trials are delayed
the more certain criminals are that they will never be punished,
and the more certain they are that they will never be punished,
the more vigorously they ply their nefarious business. Very stern
and vigorous measures are needed until we can re-establish respect
for law and order among ordinarily decent people, as well as
among professional criminals.2 4
VI. SEPARATING THE FUNCTIONS OF JUDGE AND JURY
1. Fixing the penalty. The jury should determine the guilt, the
judge should assess the penalty. In Texas, however, we have made
the mistake of placing upon the jury these two contradictory
duties to be performed at one and the same time-the duty of deciding whether the defendant has in fact committed the crime
charged, and the duty of deciding what penalty should be assessed
against him. The former function requires that the minds of the
jurors shall not be prejudiced against the defendant by proof of
his former crimes and delinquencies. The latter function, that of
deciding what punishment or restraint should be placed upon him,
can only be intelligently performed by a person or group of persons who know as much as possible about his past. Hence, the
jury should never have been charged with the duty of fixing the
penalty.
The separation of the function of finding guilt from the function of fixing the penalty, as here suggested, exists in practically
24 A step in the direction of getting rid of the special venire was taken in 1949, when
the legislature provided that in any county having a city of 231,500 population, or over,
a district judge might refuse to order a special venire when as many as 100 jurors had
been summoned for the week in which the capital case had been set. Tex. Acts 1949.
51st Leg. p. 1372, c. 623, § 1.
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all Anglo-American jurisdictions, including about forty states of
this country. In several of the ten states where this double duty
is placed on the jury, it is limited to cases involving the death
penalty. In the other forty states and in all other English-speaking countries the jury determines the question of guilt, and the
judge assesses the penalty.
2. Repeal of the Suspended Sentence Law. In view of the foregoing fundamental principle, it is submitted that the Suspended
Sentence Law of 1913 should be repealed. In 1935 the people of
Texas adopted an amendment to the constitution authorizing the
legislature to enact a modern probation statute. Such a statute was
passed in 1947.25 This act authorized the trial judge to release
convicted persons on probation, upon such conditions as he might
see fit to prescribe. There seems to be no reason to keep the old
law on the statute books any longer.
The worst feature of the old law is that it presents in the most
aggravated form the objection urged in the preceding section,
that is, the combining of two wholly inconsistent duties in the jury,
to be performed by them at one and the same time. To determine
the question of guilt, all evidence of the defendant's past crimes
should be rigidly excluded from the jury. To determine whether
the sentence should be suspended, all evidence of past crimes and
misdemeanors and other misconduct, should be presented to them
to enable them to make a reasonably accurate judgment as to
whether the defendant might make good if given another chance.
Where these two functions are separated, as they are everywhere but in Texas, the jury can intelligently perform its rightful
function of determining whether the defendant is guilty of the
particular crime as charged in the indictment. Then, after the
jury is discharged, the trial judge can take his time for studying
the defendant's record, as disclosed by the reports of probation
officers and by the records of the various bureaus of criminal
identification, state and national. He can then, in the light of all
25

Tex. Acts 1947, 50th Leg., p. 1049, c. 452; TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. (Vernon, 1948)

art. 781b.
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available data, decide whether or not the defendant should be
sent to prison or should be released on probation. When the jury
grants a suspended sentence, it is a shot in the dark by men
wholly without experience in such matters. When the judge grants
probation, it is a deliberate choice, based not only on all available
information, but on the judge's years of experience and observation of the results obtained in other cases that he has handled.
Not only is that true, but the judge can lay down reasonable
conditions for the probationer to observe, and can follow them
up and see that they are enforced. On the other hand, the jury
cannot lay down and enforce conditions, for the obvious reason
that the jury ceases to exist as a body the moment it is discharged.
The defendant is given a slap on the wrist and set at large until
again arrested and convicted of a serious crime. Under the probation law the judge, through probation officers, can keep him under
surveillance for many months or even years.
For these reasons it is clear that the Suspended Sentence Law
should be replaced and the new probation law, with such amendments as may be found necessary, should be made use of by all
judges.26
VII.

SHORTENING AND SIMPLIFYING THE INDICTMENT

1. The Common Sense Indictment Act. The common law form
of indictment, which was used in Texas from 1836 to 1881, was
one of the most weird and fantastic legal instruments ever devised
by the fertile brain of the mediaeval draftsman.27 This form of
indictment was used in Texas for nearly half a century. In 1881
the Legislature of Texas stepped far out in front of the procession when, under the leadership of Judge W. K. Homan, a
Christian minister, who was serving as state senator from Burleson County, it adopted the Common Sense Indictment Law.2" This
26 For an early criticism of the Suspended Sentence Law, see the present writer's
article, The Suspended Sentence and Adult Probation, 1 Tex. L. Rev. 188 (1923).
27 For an excellent example of it see Barrington v. State, 198 Mo. 23, 36, 95 S. W.
238 (1906) ; Potts, New Rules of Criminal Procedure-A Suggestion, 23 Tex. L. Rev.
214, 225 n. 30.
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law sought to make an indictment understandable to a person of
ordinary intelligence.
This act accomplished a great deal in shortening and simplifying the indictment, even though five of the twenty-seven forms it
prescribed were held unconstitutional. Since Homan's day, most
of the Anglo-American jurisdictions have caught up with us, and
some have far outstripped us.
In this later progressive movement England took the lead by
enacting the Indictment Act of 1915.2" Fifteen years later, in
1930, the American Law Institute, after five years of labor by a
group of leading American authorities on Criminal Law and Procedure,"0 and the expenditure of more than $150,000, issued its
model Code of Criminal Procedure, which has been adopted in
part in many states of the union, and, practically without change,
in Arizona. Finally, on March 21, 1946, the Supreme Court of the
United States, put in full force and effect its Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the lower federal courts. 8 '
For purposes of comparison there are set out on p. 452 in
parallel columns the forms of indictment for theft of a horse now
in use in Texas, in the courts of the United States, in England,
and the form prescribed by the American Law Institute Code.
These changes in the codes of criminal procedure throughout
the world point to a great change in public opinion in regard to
law enforcement. As a result, the present writer is of the opinion
that if the Common Sense Indictment Law were re-enacted at this
time it would meet with a very different reception from what it
received in 1881. He therefore makes two suggestions for the
consideration of the next legislature.
1. No reversals for formal errors. He suggests that the legislature enact a law in something like the following language:
28 Tex. Acts 1881, c. 57, p. 60, carried forward in the Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1895 as arts. 448 to 464, and re-appearing as CODE OF CraM. Peoc. (1925) arts. 405
to 412.
29 The Indictment Act 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. V, c. 90.
s0 AM. LAW INST. CODE CRIM. Paoc. (1930).
3' 5 F.R.D 573-672.
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No information or indictment for any offense shall be held insufficient because it does not contain any formal opening or concluding
statement, or because it fails to show to what district court the indictment was presented.
Under this statute the following simple indictment would be
good:
The grand jurors of Dallas County charge that, on May 10th, 1950,
in Dallas County, John Doe stole, or did steal, one horse, the property
of Richard Roe.
John Smith, Foreman.
The appellate court judicially knows that the grand jury of
Dallas County, when it acts as a grand jury, does so "in the name
and by the authority of the State of Texas." It also judicially
knows that the committing of any crime is "against the peace and
dignity of the State." Hence these formal matters should not be
required to be stated in the indictment, nor should it be reversible
error to fail to name the court to which the indictment was
returned.
It is also clear that the statements found in our present indictments concerning the impaneling and swearing of the grand jury
are wholly useless. An indictment containing such averments is no
more exempt from attack than one omitting them, if in fact the
grand jury was not properly impaneled. Nor is there any value
whatever in including in the indictment a statement to the effect
that the grand jury was impaneled for the purpose of inquiring
into the violations of law "within the body of said county." The
duties of the grand jury are prescribed by the Constitution and
statutes of the State and need not be recited in any indictment.
2. A suggested constitutional amendment. The second suggestion the writer offers on this subject is that the substance of the
foregoing proposed statute be embodied in an amendment to the
constitution to be submitted to the people for ratification-this,
merely as a matter of insurance against the possibility that the
Court of Criminal Appeals might hold the proposed statute unconstitutional.
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VIII. CONFERRING THE RULE-MAKING POWER ON THE
SUPREME COURT

During the last thirty or forty years there has been a growing
movement away from legislature-made rules of court procedure.
Many states, possibly a majority of our states, have decided that
the best results are obtained when rules of procedure are made
by the courts themselves, assisted by a commission composed of
outstanding lawyers, trial judges, criminal prosecutors, defense
attorneys, law teachers, and representatives of the press.
The State of Texas adopted this plan in 1939 in establishing
the present rules of procedure in the civil courts.82 It is believed
that the same method should be used in modernizing and simplifying the rules of criminal procedure.
In 1948 a special committee of the State Bar of Texas, in
recommending this procedure stated its advantages as follows:
"(1) Most authorities agree that adopting rules of procedure should
be a judicial rather than a legislative function, and can be more expertly
done by the highest court than by the Legislature; (2) that tribunal,
more than any other body or group, will be able to provide effective
safeguards for protecting the constitutional rights of citizens; and (3)
such method provides a means for constant improvement of our procedure in the future. It is the method now successfully used by most of
the states and by the Federal Government."

The State Bar committee in its report noted that the reason for
suggesting the Supreme Court as the agency for revising the rules
rather than the Court of Criminal Appeals was that the rule-

making power is vested by the state constitution (Art. V, § 25) in
the Supreme Court. The report was adopted by an overwhelming
vote of the members present at the Houston meeting. In making
this recommendation, the bar committee added:
"It is to be assumed that in this matter the Supreme Court would

very largely look to and be guided by the suggestions of the Court of
Criminal Appeals. There is no reason to anticipate difficulty here, be-

82 Tex. Acts 1939, c. 25,

p. 201.
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cause the comity between these two courts has long been a matter of
record and judicial history. All rules so adopted would, of course, be
subject to the power of the Legislature to amend or repeal.""''

IX.

REMOVING OUR JUDGES FROM POLITICS

Perhaps the most baneful influence to which our judiciary is
subjected results from our method of selecting our judges by
popular election, and for short terms of office. Some of the resulting evils may here be briefly mentioned:
1. Many of the ablest attorneys are wholly unwilling to resort
to the methods of campaigning that seem to be necessary to secure
nomination and election.
2. In the larger counties the outlay of money and time to secure
election is very large. For example, in Dallas County the filing
fee to get one's name on the primary election ballot is $1,500. To
mail a postal card to each voter in the county adds another
thousand or more dollars. The use of road signs, newspaper
advertisements, circulars and the like, adds other thousands.
3. The successful candidate frequently goes into office under
heavy obligations to political workers and large contributorsobligations that are hard for the ordinary mortal to forget when
.the interests of such supporters arise in his court.
4. It is also very difficult for the judge on the bench to forget
that he will wish to be a candidate again in two or four years,
and that a strict hewing to the line in his rulings may offend a
politically powerful litigant or an influential attorney, or group
of attorneys, who could easily induce some ambitious young lawyer to become a candidate against him. Even if the judge felt sure
of his ability to win re-election, it costs a lot of money to make
the race. Even the judges on the supreme court are not free from
political harassment, and we here in Texas have just witnessed
the spectacle of several members of our highest court having
33 For a recent discussion of the subject of court-made rules of procedure see
George G. Potts, Reform of Criminal Procedure-Judicialor Legislative Problem? 1
Tex. L. & Leg. 6 (1947) and authorities cited in note 3. This article was reprinted in 10
Tex. Bar Jour. 460 (1947).
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to spend much time, money, and energy to keep from having their
judicial careers cut short by defeat at the polls. It is quite probable that the stress and strain of the campaign and the humiliation resulting from his defeat caused, or at least contributed to,
the untimely death of a member of the court whose prior record
was good but who had not been on the supreme court long enough
to show the people of the state what he could do.
Two feasible ways are open to us for getting our courts out
of politics:
1. Appointment by the executive with, or without, ratification
by the Senate. This method has been used with success, time out
of mind, in England and in her overseas dominions. It has also
been used in our Federal Government from the beginning, and in
a number of our older states.
2. The Missouri Plan, which the State Bar of Texas has approved. This plan was briefly explained by Judge James M.
Douglas, of the Supreme Court of Missouri, in an address before
the State Bar of Texas in 1948. The following brief quotation
from his address sets out the main features of the plan:
"Judges are nominated by commissions consisting both of laymen
and lawyers. Names of three competent, qualified nominees are submitted to the Governor. He selects one of them. The new judge serves
for one year, then goes on a ballot in the next election without political
designation. The people have thus had a chance to see him in action,
and to judge his record. They go to the polls and simply answer one
question: Shall Judge Blank of the Blank Court be retained in office?
Yes or No? If retained he then serves a full term before he is again
subject to be voted on. If he is turned out, a new appointee is selected
in the same manner.
"Thus, the wisdom of a nominating committee, the responsibility of
a Governor, and the ' will
of the people are combined in providing an
'
improved judiciary. 14
It is believed that the adoption of either of the two methods of
selecting our trial and our appellate judges would within a few
i4

Tex. L. Rev. Bar Ass'n Number, 1948, p. 72.
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years bring about a vast improvement in the quality of our judges,
and in the speed and certainty of their administration of justice
in the courts.
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